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Perspectives and Uses of History 
Arpad Szakolczai 
University College Cork 
 
 
The significance of history and the meaning of its ignoring 
 
In our days, if somebody makes any reference to the historical aspects of a particular 
problem or question in sociology, not to mention in economics, but increasingly even in 
politics and philosophy, the standard response is a certain bemused smile; the 
acknowledgement of utter irrelevance and waste of time. In order to be read and heard, 
to be influential, to receive grants, one must live in the present, become absorbed into 
the minute details of the current, global reality, which extends in space, due to 
simultaneous communication, but whose time horizon is increasingly reduced to the 
now. This leaves only two answers possible: one must follow this lead, as a necessary 
strategy for survival – or one is forced to step back, following the basic attitude of 
academic research, but also of painting, and perceive exactly here the key that gives an 
access to what is wrong in the times we are living. As becoming obsessively, 
claustrophobically enclosed into the present moment, hanging on the daily journals and 
the television news to get a confirmation that we indeed exist, is a very pathological 
condition. The onus of proof is not on the part of those who insist on bringing up 
historical conditions and arguments, rather on those who ignore it, proliferating an 
extremely short-sighted vision of life, which without the shadow of a doubt will produce 
unprecedented calamities, whether concerning nature, society, or the human personality. 
The real problem is not to justify why we need a ‘historical perspective’, but to 
understand what could have caused this amazing blindness, a genuine epidemic of mental 
myopia. 
 For this, the first point is to realise that literally everything that is concerned with 
reality, with real, concrete beings, whether living or inorganic, is historical; and that this 
realisation is one of the most important achievements of modern science. The point is 
not simply that no human being can be understood without its biography, just as no 
culture and community without it history, but that nature is also historical, and even our 
entire planet, with its mountain peaks and valleys, lakes, rivers and seas is a historical 
formation. One of the most important scientific discoveries of the modern period 
concerns geology, and evolutionary biology, just as archaeology, all of which radically 
altered our understanding of not simply life but the character of the planet in which we 
live, were rendered possible by geology. But if we move to cosmology, we can complete 
the argument by saying that the formation of the planetary system is also a temporal, 
historical process. 
 While all this may sound a triviality, I think the consequences of such trivial facts 
for our contemporary reality were not properly drawn. This is partly due to a series of 
major terminological confusions. The first concerns the opposition between nature and 
culture, leading to the dualism of ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ sciences, and the dualistic mode 
of thinking, the fateful legacy of Descartes, Kant and Hegel. While nature and culture are 
certainly not identical, they have a proper, non-conflictual relationship, which is based on 
their historical co-existence and joint formation; that fact that nature, in the proper sense 
of the word, is a par excellence historical category. What this means is that the flora and 
the fauna, the plants, animals and other living beings that share our space were not the 
outcome of some ‘necessary’ and ‘logical’ developments which could be reproduced, 
technologically and in some laboratories, but came into being through the accidents of 
history, over an extremely long process of development, and the fundamental attitude we 
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human should have concerning this historical outcome, which is ‘nature’ as we see it – or 
rather as we saw it before modern technology – is some kind of awe, respect and 
humility. The reason we moderns lack such an attitude is because we not only broke, 
inexplicably and unjustifiedly, the link between nature and culture, but also confused 
nature and technology, as codified in the absurd expression ‘natural science’, meaning 
preparing for technological manipulation. Newtonian science is not natural science, but 
anti-natural science – which does not imply that it is not ‘true’, rather that, as Nietzsche 
and Foucault perceived it so well, there are some problems with the meaning and 
significance of ‘truth’. Since at least Newton truth has become a problem, the destruction 
of the world through truth being one of the most fundamental, no matter how 
paradoxical problems we have to face. 
 Before moving further, another conceptual paradox must be solved, and this 
concerns the relationship between history and tradition. The problem can be seen in an 
established – though somewhat obsolete – terminology, the so-called ‘people without 
history’. Such people, however, were never supposed to lack traditions as well – and 
traditions are nothing else but the accumulation of experiences, know-how and 
knowledge. Thus, in a fundamental sense, every tradition is profoundly historical – which 
is evident even from the etymology of ‘tradition’, which is some kind of ‘passing on’. 
 Yet, the distinction between culture and civilisation, or between people with or 
without ‘history’ is not completely meaningless. It helps to establish a distinction not 
simply in the ‘time perspective’ or ‘mentality’ of people with or without ‘history’, but 
between the character of two different kinds of ‘historical’ event: one which adds further 
and further layers to the tradition, which can include differentiation, distinction and 
sharpening; and one which produces a genuine break or fracturing. It is to such radical or 
destructive ‘rupturing’ that our understanding of ‘history’ is connected, and this can again 
be even etymologically connected to the term ‘history’, which is to be traced back to a 
PIE root implying ‘seeing’, implying that – in contrast to the anonymous and long-term 
transmission of traditions – history is connected to the actual memories transmitted by 
those concrete individuals who lived through and eye-witnessed such traumatic events, 
which in Hungarian can evidently be traced back to ‘breaking’ or ‘destroying’ (see 
történelem ‘history’ and tör ‘break’). Thus, there are two different kind of developments, 
associated with history: the gradual formation of identities through the accumulation of 
differences and experiences, or the formation of traditions, which in culture is not so 
different from the way nature is also the accumulated effects of the various species and 
geological formations and layers; and radical breaks which fundamentally reorder cultural 
traditions – which can again be paralleled to the way volcanic activities, earthquakes and 
the like re-shape nature – and which, by the way, are also fundamental forces altering 
human cultures as well. 
 Once such a conceptual clarification between history and tradition established, 
two further terms must be introduced in order to be able to analyse modalities of the 
radical and effective confusion of this framework. The first is a concept invented by 
Gregory Bateson, one of the most important and independent thinkers of the last 
century, who facing the incomprehensible reality, especially violence, of life in Papua 
New Guinea came up with the term ‘schismogenesis’. This term serves to identify breaks 
that happened in the past of societies which did not keep a concrete memory of such 
events, but where the character of culture is unintelligible without assuming the facticity 
of radical and disastrous breaks that have destroyed the integrity of particular cultures. 
Bateson’s concept is a stunning example of what Nietzsche called the ability to draw 
‘backward inferences’. The second problem concerns the proper identification of the 
kind of radical breaks that shaped, over long millennia, the substance and mode of 
thinking of the modern world. 
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 This last preliminary point concerns the identification of a singular factor that has 
contributed more than anything else to the confusion between history and tradition, 
nature and culture, and the general ignoring of the historico-traditional component, and 
yet has not yet been identified: the alchemic mode of thinking, or mentality, central both 
for technology and the belief in the revolution. In identifying this mentality I follow the 
recent work of Agnes Horvath (2009, 2013). 
 
The alchemic mind-set 
 
Central to the alchemic mode of thinking is a radical altering of the value associated with 
the self-evident negative valorisation of historical disruptions. Any event that represents 
a radical break with the established, accepted and taken for granted ways of living, 
whether due to a natural disaster, endemic illness, an internal collapse of social order, 
warfare or invasion was by definition assigned a negative value, the central effort of any 
community being to restore order and return to normality. Unique to the alchemic mode 
of thinking, defining its specificity is the idea that such a disruption can be good – even a 
prelude to great, unprecedented prosperity. In other words, this is the idea that there are 
no fixed values – anything that seems bad can turned to a good use; and, even more, that 
therefore one should outright provoke bad things to happen, so that such latent benefits, 
hindered by the existing state of affairs, could be realised. In still other words, this is at 
the heart of what Nietzsche captured as the great ‘revaluation of values’. 
 Given the eminently counter-intuitive, even absurd nature of such a claim, it is 
necessary to investigate the condition of possibility of such a mentality, and also 
explaining why I call this mentality ‘alchemical’. There are two major possibilities here. 
First, such an operation can be justified by redefining the existing state of affairs as a trap 
or a cage from which one must break out. This idea can be traced back to the Gnostics, 
but fails to explain how human reality could have been transformed into such a 
suffocating form of existence in the first place. One should also note that evidently 
human cultures that actually stumbled into such trap-like situations had little ability to 
escape it, as evidenced by Bateson’s concept ‘schismogenesis’ and the need to come up 
with such a conceptual invention. The solution therefore must be searched at another 
level: a direct and evident improvement produced by a violent breaking of entities. It is 
here that a single historical moment gains particular significance, the discovery of 
metallurgy, of which alchemy was a theoretisation. 
 The discovery of metal making was of course of one the most important 
moments in the history of technology, and one could even argue that it still serves as the 
model for our understanding of ‘technology’. It is radically different from the invention 
of agriculture, for instance, as agriculture does not involve a radical destruction – though 
even in this case the long-term, even mid-term consequences of the technological 
innovation were radically destructive (see population explosion and land erosion). Metals 
can only be gained if stones, proverbially associated with solidity, are liquefied, their 
stability destroyed, and the resulting liquid ore is poured into containers prepared in 
advance, by which identical objects can be mass-produced – objects which offer the 
illusion of richness, as more and more people can deploy them, thinking they became 
suddenly ‘illustrious’, until it is realised that now ‘everybody’ has them; and so at a second 
stage more and more weapons can be used to equip an army which can take away what 
other people have – until it is further realised that they also mostly only have similar 
technologically mass-produced, thus meaningless objects – though once the mimetic 
cycles of imitation and violence is set in motion it is difficult to stop. 
 The prosperity brought about by technology is always illusionary – yet, the idea 
creation out of destruction can always be deceptively, physically supported by the 
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‘cheaper’ and ‘more efficient’ objects produced by technology, so the long-term negative 
consequences are repeatedly overlooked. This is because, and moving closer to 
contemporary times, the purely technological argument is complemented by the social 
revolutionary argument, the claim that socio-political destruction, or ‘the revolution’, is a 
way to escape the intolerable social and political conditions – which are indeed such, 
except that they were not perennial, rather produced by the technological-alchemic 
mentality which now offers itself again as the solution to the problem it itself created, 
thus spinning the spiral ever further. Here the circle can be closed, and stopped, by 
realising that the denial of the significance of history, the closing into the present after the 
supposed big bang of the great destruction of all traditions is the ultimate trick of 
technology, the manner in which it renders its nefarious power invisible invisible. The 
logic of technology is a peculiar combination of a once-and-for-all revolutionary break, 
and then the ideal of the permanent revolution; an idea where – through their shared 
alchemic mode of thinking – the identity of the logic of capitalist entrepreneurship and 
the Bolshevik revolution, or Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) and Leon Trotsky (1879-
1940), exact contemporaries, can be recognised. According to both, in the first stage the 
power of ‘tradition’ must be broken; human culture, meaning not just ‘high culture’ but 
the set of skills and ways of doing as it existed for millennia must simply be destroyed. In 
the second stage, a permanent terror of innovativeness must be nurtured, in which the 
logic of fragmentation and integration must be permanently maintained, until every 
single community, every human being and every natural object is put into the service of 
the anonymous and omnipotent ‘public’ – whether measured through market value or 
the judgment of the all-powerful party. The central principle of both is that no stone 
should be left untouched. Here one should notice that, apart from perhaps extreme 
examples (though Schumpeter is not considered an extremist, rather the classic figure of 
the theory of entrepreneurial innovation), the central evolutionary logic of structural 
functionalism, whether in Comte, Spencer, or Durkheim or in the more recent theories 
of Habermas, Luhmann or Jeffrey Alexander, explicitly identifies the same dynamic: 
linear, evolutionary progress is achieved through the division and organisation of labour; 
through the continuous process of differentiation and integration, de-fusion and re-
fusion. 
 
The effective re-capturing of history, the concrete analysis of the events that led to the 
present state of affairs, a genuine ‘history of the present’ was offered by the genealogical 
perspective pioneered by Nietzsche, and continued by a significant stream of genuine 
‘master thinkers’. 
 
Genealogy as method: The advantages of being a philologist 
 
In the previous section social evolutionism, just as political revolutionism, were traced to 
an identical alchemical mentality: the idea that a prerequisite both to ‘genuine’ science, 
and the realisation of an ideal social order is the destroying, breaking down or wiping 
away of all concrete, existing, historically established traditions,i and on the tabula rasa or 
void build something new that is pure, uncontaminated by the previous vicissitudes of 
history. The identity of the scientifico-technological and politico-revolutionary mentality 
is established with striking symbolical power by the year 1642, date of birth of Isaac 
Newton and the moment to which etymological dictionaries assign the first time the 
word ‘revolution’ acquired its modern meaning. The link to alchemy is secured by the 
fact that, as it is well known, Newton was engaged in extensive alchemic experiments, 
while the Marxist idea of the revolution similarly emphasises that the revolution should 
not be guided by utopian ideals to be realised, but focus on the complete destruction of 
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the old order of things – the building up of the new, on this radical basis, will take care 
of itself. 
 This alchemic mentality, on the back of the ‘scientific revolution’, the 
Enlightenment idea of progress and evolutionism, and the political and industrial 
revolutions had such a thorough impact on European thinking that in philosophy, 
historiography and the burgeoning social and human sciences was gaining uncontested 
dominance. A new and better, indeed right way of thinking concerning history emerged 
out of a most unlikely combination of sources, in a terminology recalling Tolkien’s Lord 
of the Rings: when a philologist (Nietzsche) encountered geology (the works of Lyell), 
developing a new idea of ‘genealogy’, which eventually lead a disenchanted philosopher 
turned psychiatrist (Foucault) to coin the term ‘archaeology of knowledge’.  
 Nietzsche’s profession of being a philologist, as Foucault famously recognised 
(1970: 305), indeed played an important part in this process, as the first glimpses of his 
elaboration of the ‘genealogical method’ can be traced to his unpublished ‘Untimely 
Meditation’ about philology.ii Philology can be considered as an archaeology of the 
language, in the sense that there the manner in which texts, or words (in etymology) are 
built upon each other must be analysed, layer after layer, thus one must, as a professional 
prerequisite, overcome the modernist prejudice which rather tries to see the past in terms 
of the magnifying glass of the present. Such a reversal of perspective poses a 
considerable difficulty even in archaeology, as a recent article argues (Simonetti 2013). 
 The application of this logic is even more tricky, and difficult, for the social 
sciences, as the reversal of perspective implies not simply a once-for-all shift – instead of 
looking backwards, anachronistically, on history, one must return to the ‘origins’ and 
then reconstruct ‘effective history’, or how the tissue of the present was made; but it 
implies a permanent, iterative oscillation. 
 This means the following. We envision the history of the 19th century mostly by 
concepts that were developed in the 20th century, and which, in spite of their analytical 
usefulness, were also contaminated by taking for granted the reality of the 20th century. 
Even further, given that the world that still existed in the 19th century collapsed around 
WWI, evidently becoming decadent – using a central term of the late 19th century – our 
vision of this reality is furthermore coloured by the later, decadent phase of this reality, 
projecting the decadence into the very ‘nature’ of the entity. Now, if we jump back a 
further century, the situation becomes even more complicated, as our vision of the 18th 
century is not only shaped by concepts of the 20th century, but also by perspectives 
developed in the 19th century, having a partial impact on the conceptual frameworks of 
the 20th century as well, and raising the problem of decadence to another level. Thus, in 
order to perform ‘effective history’, we also need to engage in a genealogy of our own 
conceptual apparatus, sifting through layers and layers of ossified thinking, rendering the 
undertaking extremely complicated.  
 
Such considerations yield two, somewhat paradoxical and quite uncomfortable, but still 
inevitable results; points that were spelled out more or less explicitly by the most 
important scholars whose works fit into the line of Nietzschean genealogy. First, 
genealogical work can only be done on the basis of a minute and thorough familiarity 
with the concrete historical research accomplished by the experts in the field; results 
which, however, must be brought together and situated inside a genealogical narrative, 
which goes necessarily way beyond the time horizon experts are used to. Second, such a 
work is rendered even more difficult by the fact that non-genealogical approaches within 
the social sciences must simply be ignored, as they will be marred by the failure to 
perform the necessary, self-reflexive conceptual work, rather only synthesising the 
evidence, without questioning the ‘alchemic’ mindset characteristic of evolutionary and 
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revolutionary thinking, and therefore only produce a meaningless compendium of 
selected empirical evidence, no matter how erudite, in support of a present-driven and 
thus complacent and anachronistic ideological framework. A genealogist must stick to 
the evidence and to the proper methods, meaning that methodologically unsound 
historicising works are simply useless – even though, given the nature of academic life, 
some of the most influential works in the historically oriented social sciences must by 
force be produced in such methodologically questionable manner, supported both by the 
dominant ‘scientific’ (indeed technologico-alchemic) methodology, and the hegemony of 
present-centred and self-congratulatory normative perspectives. 
 Fortunately, works that soundly use a genealogical perspective, mostly directly 
derived from Nietzsche and/or Weber, are not few in numbers. Apart from Foucault, 
they include the life-works of Eric Voegelin, Norbert Elias, Franz Borkenau, Lewis 
Mumford, Philippe Ariès, Reinhart Koselleck, and crucial works by Gerhard Oestreich, 
Albert Hirschman, Alphonse Dupront or Norman Cohn. But one can even extend this 
to many works in civilisational analysis, inspired by Weberian sociology, and following 
the work of S.N. Eisenstadt on the axial age (taking inspiration from Karl Jaspers, the 
most important direct ‘disciple’ of Weber,  in cotrast to the travesty propagated by Alfred 
Weber, and transmitted to Talcott Parsons), including works by Johann Arnason, Bjorn 
Wittrock, Peter Wagner, Bernhard Giesen, and Manusos Marangudakis. Obviously, this 
list merely serves as an illustration, and cannot be construed as intended to be exclusive. 
 
Beyond genealogy as we know it 
 
Thus, apart from the widest available empirical evidence, genealogists can only use the 
work of other genealogists, not due to methodological dogmatism, but the need to avoid 
methodologically unsafe, misleading, dogmatic approaches. And yet, I would argue that 
in three major respects it is also necessary to go beyond the word, though not the spirit, 
of most existing genealogies of modernity. 
 
1. Incorporating anthropological concepts 
 
The first concerns the need to improve the genealogical method by incorporating certain 
anthropological concepts. There are two reasons why the incorporation of such concepts 
into genealogy is fundamental. First, the aim of genealogy is to tear ourselves away from 
the taken for granted concepts of contemporary, modernising social theory, gaining a 
distance from the present, and thus reconstructing the manner in which its fabric was 
made. However, most genealogists use concepts that are themselves part of the 
dictionary of modern social theory. The incorporation of anthropological concepts can 
help to improve and upgrade this conceptual tool-kit by ideas developed by 
anthropologists within their fieldwork, in a non-Western setting. 
 However, not every anthropological concept is equally valuable for this purpose. 
There are three fundamental points to mention here. First, and most evidently, 
anthropologists who developed concepts that could be helpful to improve genealogy 
preferably undertook extensive fieldwork in a local non-Western setting, as a background 
for the development of new theoretical ideas. Second, however, it is also of vital 
importance that such anthropologists not spend their fieldwork for simply ‘testing’ the 
same old ideas developed for the study of Western modernity, repeating modernising 
commonplaces, whether in its structural-functionalist, Marxist or Freudian sense, but be 
capable of going beyond their education and develop new conceptual tools on the basis 
of their own experiences. Finally, in developing new concepts a particularly important 
role can be played by in-depth comparative studies. 
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 The second major reason why anthropologically based concepts could so well 
balance the distancing of genealogy is that while genealogical analysis, since Nietzsche’s 
work, especially as its central points were formulated in the Preface to the Genealogy of 
Morals, is fundamentally concerned with the study of the conditions out of which 
practices with lasting significance developed – thus, how the spirit of capitalism grew out 
of the Reformation, or tragedy out of music – it did not have a proper methodological 
tool to analyse the manner in which certain conditions produce lasting effects. 
 It will be argued that four concepts developed by anthropological theorists offer 
a unique potential to upgrade genealogical analysis, by offering a powerful method to 
assess how certain ‘conditions of emergence’ can ‘stamp’ a particular mode of conduct 
on a particular group of people who become its ‘carriers’, altering very substantially and 
for a lasting time the course of cultures or civilisations. These concepts are ‘liminality’, 
‘imitation’, ‘trickster’, and ‘schismogenesis’. 
 
Liminality 
The term ‘liminality’ was introduced in a classic 1909 book by Arnold van Gennep, Rites 
de passage. The work, based on a magisterial review of existing anthropology literature, 
was prepared to offer a theoretical foundation of the then young discipline, but had the 
bad luck of not only preceding Durkheim’s boo by three years, but offering a radically 
different foundational idea, and van Gennep made things even worse by writing in 1913 
a strongly critical book review of Durkheim. As a result, van Gennep was basically 
excommunicated from French academic life, and the book was not even translated into 
English for half a century. The term would only become widely used after Victor Turner 
accidentally picked it up in the mid-1960s, and then made it into the cornerstone of his 
‘processual anthropology’ – a concept that, as he explicitly acknowledged, suddenly 
offered him the tool to make sense of his research experiences which his teachers in 
Oxford, London and Manchester were not able to do. 
 However, helped by the work of the three editors of International Political 
Anthropology,iii this paper will extend the term in a direction beyond the intentions of van 
Gennep and Turner. While van Gennep emphasised the transformative potentials of the 
rite, and Turner placed the emphasis on its playful, creative aspects, its ability to 
undermine structural ossification, generating a sense of community (communitas), its full 
potential for genealogical analysis is opened up by recognising the fear and anxiety 
generated by temporary, unsettled, uncertain real-world large-scale liminal situations.  
 Under conditions of a ritual the explosive potential of liminality is contained by 
the presence of ‘masters of ceremony’, whose authority during the temporary suspension 
of order is accepted without any challenge. However, when in real life the previously take 
for granted order of things crumbles, this produces a tremendous existential uncertainty, 
and given that every safeguard of order and meaning is lost, it is not certain that the 
situations produce persons who can fill the function of real world ‘masters of 
ceremonies’. 
 
Imitation 
At any rate, the most evident outcome of a liminal situation, the sudden disappearance of 
boundaries and ordering principles is the escalation of imitative processes. This 
phenomenon was analysed, in Durkheim’s time, by Gustave Le Bon, an important 
though not fully acknowledged source of Durkheim’s work; by Gabriel Tarde, his arch-
enemy, whose work, after long decades of neglect, was revitalised by Bruno Latour and 
also taken up by International Political Anthropology;iv and by René Girard, who developed 
his theory of the triangular of ‘mimetics of desire’ on the basis of 19th century novels, 
and then, through an extensive review of anthropological and mythological material, 
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developed his theories about ‘scapegoating’ and the ‘sacrificial mechanism’. The central 
idea of Le Bon and Tarde is that whenever the social order is collapsing, the most direct 
result is not simply the exercising of the brain, implying a rational search for a way out, 
but rather – or at the same time – escalating processes of imitation, basically following 
the logic of panic, whether at a natural disaster, a crash of the stock-market, or a fire 
breaking out in a movie theatre or a ball-room. Girard’s work analyses a somewhat 
different dynamics, when an imitation of desire produces a rivalry between two 
individuals, then groups, until the community is destroyed by a kind of civil war, and 
only the killing of a sacrificial victim can restore order. 
 Rationalist approaches, while ideologically ignore imitative processes, cannot 
explain the way liminal crises are solved, as rationality requires a stable framework on the 
basis of which the results of different actions can be properly calculated (a point realised 
even by John M. Keynes, and placed at the heart of the theory of expectations, the core 
of his classic book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money), and the legal 
system that sanctions deviations. Thus, Weber’s sociology needed the introduction of the 
figure of the ‘charismatic leader’ who is supposed to suddenly come out of the blue and 
resolve the crises. However, nothing in itself guarantees that such a charismatic person 
would indeed appear; and thus it might happen that uncertain conditions only provide 
the breeding ground for a quite different type of figure, for which anthropologists came 
up with the name ‘trickster’. 
 
Trickster 
The trickster was introduced into anthropology by Paul Radin, the first PhD student of 
Franz Boas, the (re-)founder of American anthropology. Radin was thus destined to 
become the leader of the school, but something was not working out – he never had a 
fixed position, and his book on the trickster was not published until 1956, under the 
instigation of Jung and Kerenyi. It is still not clear what was going on and why (Diamond 
1981). 
 At any rate, with the delay of half a century the concept became a widely used 
tool for anthropologists, mythologists and literary scholars, though social and political 
scientists are still reluctant to employ it.v The central idea is that under uncertain and 
confusing conditions, when people look for guidance, somebody who could solve the 
difficulties that seem insurmountable, it might happen that they mistake as a charismatic 
hero a trickster who can pretend or fake to offer unusual remedy. According to the various 
anthropological stories and mythologies, the trickster is an outsider who is not touched 
by the emotional involvement of the events, and who can therefore insinuate himself at 
the centre of attention, pretending to hold the key to the solution while he is only 
interested in proliferating confusion, as his power is conditional upon the rest of the 
population being kept in a state of limbo. Classical trickster figures include Hermes and 
Prometheus in Greek mythology, Loki in Skandinavian mythology, the leprechaun of 
Irish folktales, the coyote of the prairie, or the various Western African spider, rabbit or 
monkey quasi-deities. The term can help us to understand the nature of the totalitarian 
systems of the 20th century, and even of manner in which capitalism uses ‘passionate 
interests’ (Tarde, Latour), and cannot be reduced to exploitation or oppression. The 
more European thinking became rationalistic, mechanical, formalistic, structural and 
institutional, the more social and political life became ready to be infested with imitative 
processes, like mimetic desire, presented by trickster figures as the nature of the human 
condition; or passionate devotion to incompetent political leaders, leading people into 
revolution, or terrorising them with its threat. 
 
Schismogenesis 
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If social order broke down, imitative processes escalate and guidance is hijacked by 
trickster figures, normality would not be restored, and the unity of the community would 
be irretrievably lost, torn apart by ‘schismogenic’ processes. The term was developed by 
Gregory Bateson, on the basis of the fieldwork he was completing in the early 1930s in 
Papua New Guinea. Finishing a PhD in Cambridge, and educated by some of the most 
famous figures in the field, Bateson was destined to be a leading figure in anthropology – 
except that in his publication he made evident his disillusionment with the inability of his 
teachers to offer conceptual tools that would make sense of his fieldwork experiences. 
The result, alongside the by now familiar storyline, was the expulsion of Bateson from 
the paradise of academic anthropology. 
 While Bateson developed the concept for a retrospective analysis of small-scale 
tribal societies, it is also eminently applicable for a genealogy of modernity. Schisms are 
fundamental features of medieval and Renaissance history, starting with the Great 
Schism between Eastern and Western Christianity, continuing with the schisms of the 
Papacy, and ending with the Reformation. The question then becomes the way to 
identify the liminal moments and the trickster figures of the late Renaissance – 
something which I discussed, shortly, in my other presentation. 
 
Extending into Archaeology 
 
The second main step beyond existing genealogical approaches, through very much in 
the spirit of Nietzsche-Weberian genealogy, implies the incorporation of archaeological 
evidence. Thus, in a sense, it implies an approach opposite to the previous: an extension 
into the direction of empirical evidence, and not conceptual tools; yet, the two are also 
fundamentally related, as the main theoretical tools archaeologists use are 
anthropological. In fact, there is a paradox here, an implicit but definite critique of 
historical sociology: given that historically oriented social theory does not have either the 
conceptual tools, or even the interest to get involved in archaeological research, 
archaeologists – though historical sociology should be their evident interlocutor, given 
that archaeology only represents a temporal extension of history – had to turn to 
anthropology. The integration of the relevant findings and approaches of sociology, 
genealogy, anthropology and archaeology thus indeed represents one of the most 
important frontiers of research in the social sciences. 
 Such incorporation of archaeological findings is fundamental for Nietzsche-
Weber-Foucaldian genealogy, as recent archaeological evidence helps, but also forces, a 
radical reinterpretation of the still dominant, Enlightenment-based, evolutionary and 
materialist vision of the dynamics of historical change. Most importantly, it now enables 
genealogists to develop a narrative that would cover human history from the upper 
Palaeolithic, not in the sense of fitting into a detailed chronological account everything 
that ever happened, but in identifying the main liminal moments in history, and their 
eventual outcomes, thus reconstructing the proper rhythm of historical dynamics. 
 
Integrating Hermeneutics  
 
The third point, no matter how evident in may seem, still must be discussed as a novelty, 
as rarely pursued, and this concerns the need to integrate into genealogy philosophical 
hermeneutics. The connections between Heidegger and Foucault are evident, and yet still 
controversial; furthermore, while Heidegger took ideas from Max Weber, much mediated 
through Karl Löwith, who was an enchanted auditor of Weber’s ‘Science As A Vocation’ 
lecture and one of the first students of Heidegger, his work was never explicitly discussed 
by Heidegger. Foucault was also reading, with some emphasis, Dilthey and Gadamer, 
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though again never discussed it publicly; while the connection between Dilthey and 
Weber was even more peculiar. While Weber knew Dilthey since childhood, being a 
frequent guest to his father’s house, and was extensively referring to Dilthey’s work in his 
early methodological essays, after a ‘chastening’ by Rickert, the neo-Kantian high pope of 
his times, he became much more cautious, as he could not afford to defy the wrath of 
the German academic potentates. For a similar reason Dilthey, under constant attack by 
the neo-Kantians, evidently felt constrained to distance himself from Nietzsche, and thus 
the extremely strong and fecund parallels between the thinking of these two figures are 
up to our days all but unexplored. 
 As a final point, there are intriguing parallels between the hermeneutical and 
anthropological approaches. The most important of these is the similarity between the 
term ‘liminality’, developed on the basis of rites of passage, and Dilthey’s concept of 
experience, a recognition that was at the heart of the very last work of Victor Turner, cut 
short by his premature death, and thus mostly limited to posthumous publications 
(Turner 1985a, 1985b). There is also a significant affinity between the preoccupation with 
the question of home as being-in-the-world and the experience of participation, central 
for Heidegger and Gadamer, but also for Lévy-Bruhl and Colin Turnbull, two other – 
closely connected – maverick figures of anthropology, and the concern with the uncanny 
and the experience of the night, central for Heidegger but also the literature on the 
trickster, the two being connected by the work of Karl Kerenyi (1987). 
 The basis of such parallels between cultural anthropology and philosophical 
hermeneutics is provided by the philosophical anthropology of Plato. 
 
Conclusion: The ‘not’ historical, and the return to Plato 
 
At this point, hopefully, the centrality of a historical perspective, and the proper manner 
to study the unfolding of the dynamics of history, was sufficiently made – perhaps even 
too successfully. Is there anything outside history? Evidently this paper denies this, as I 
have explicitly argued that everything is historical: even life, even nature, up to minute 
aspects of the shape of the planet. 
 However, my argument was slightly different: not that everything is historical, but 
that everything concerned with real, existing beings is historical. The not-historical is 
whatever that has no being; whatever is transcendent; the eternal, the spirit, the divine. 
 This transcendent is not the Kantian transcendental. The thinking of Kant not 
only inherited Cartesian dualism, but even more the Newtonian reduction of the real to 
the filling of the void; indeed, Kant offers the philosophical foundations of the 
Newtonian vision of ‘reality’. However, Newtonian science from the perspective of our 
human existence is fundamentally unreal: instead of starting from the objects of our world 
as taken for granted, as ‘data’, in the sense of something that is ‘given’ – literally as a gift, 
both by past human generations and by millions and hundred millions of years of history 
(whether one intuits and posits a divine behind such outpouring of gifts, it does not 
really matter); it single-handedly breaks, wipes away and destroys the results of all these 
immense historical processes, and – as a modern Faustian Titan – pretends to play God, 
by recreating all this, from scratch, in his laboratory. We cannot ‘know beyond doubt’, 
can only gain conviction about whether there is a divine will beyond the shaping of such 
immense processes, or all this was the product of blind forces, only one thing is 
absolutely certain: human force cannot produce or reproduce it, only destroy it – and we 
are on the best way towards this. 
 And so, if Newton and Kant cannot be followed as guides into whatever lies 
beyond history, as their denial of the meaning of history is identical to the destruction of 
the realness and concreteness of reality, the returning of the cosmos into chaos about which 
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Aby Warburg was so afraid, then we must follow another guide into the nature of the 
non-historical, and this can only be Plato. This is certainly not the moment to go into any 
presentation of Plato’s thinking about the non-Being, transmogrified into reality by the 
Sophist, and the realm of ideas, which is different from the existing world but is not non-
Being either. Only two short points will be made. 
 First, most figures of genealogy had a particular affinity, after all, with the 
thinking of Plato. This is even true for Nietzsche, who was certainly again Platonism, and 
even problematised the figure of Socrates, but whose work was close to the spirit of 
Nietzsche. Due to his hostility to Hegel Weber did not incorporate explicit references to 
the history of philosophy, and yet the parallels between his two main lectures and two of 
Plato’s most important late dialogues, the Sophist and the Statesman are so close that they 
cannot be accidental. Foucault, as it is well known, devoted a significant part of his last 
Collège de France coursea to the thinking of Plato. Eric Voegelin, one of the most 
important direct followers of the Nietzschean Weber, became explicitly a follower of 
Plato. And the line could be continued. Perplexingly, while genealogy or radically anti-
Kantian and anti-Hegelian, in spite of certain occasional affinities and common concerns, 
it is evidently quite compatible with the thinking of Plato. And the line could be 
continued. 
 The last point, helping to understand this seeming mystery, concerns the striking 
affinities between the thinking of Plato and the four major anthropological concepts 
brought in to improve genealogy. These concepts emphatically were developed on the 
basis of empirical studies of distant non-Western people, and were so distant from 
modern social theory that their inventors literally had to pay for their innovations by 
their career. And yet, each of them has direct and close parallels with the thinking of 
Plato. The term liminality has two similes in Plato’s thinking: the apeiron (the boundless 
or unlimited) and metaxy (the in-betweenness). The first term is often called the ‘first 
word’ of Greek philosophy, present in the first fragment of Anaximander; but it was 
prominently elaborated by Plato as well in one of his most important and in many ways 
conclusive dialogue, the Philebus. Strikingly, this is also one of the dialogues in which the 
metaxy (a term singled out for particular importance by Voegelin) is discussed, the other 
being the analysis of eros in the Symposium.vi Concerning imitation, it does not require any 
detailed discussion to argue that this term played a central role in Plato’s thinking where 
– pace Kant – rationality in the sense of reasoning power was not assumed as an 
anthropological constant but as a force that could – and should – be developed in order to 
countervail the power of imitation, whenever necessary. Concerning the trickster, Plato’s 
analysis of the sophists is one of the most important means to understand the nature of 
the trickster – and it is from this perspective that the dialogue entitled the Sophist could 
gain its proper meaning and significance, often neglected and denigrated as compared to 
the earlier Socratic dialogues, but rather representing a more elaborate diagnosis of the 
illusionary power of the sophists, as it shifts attention from mere rhetoric to using the 
magical power of images – thus having a particular relevance for our times. Finally, 
concerning schismogenesis, Bateson received a good grounding in Plato, not surprising 
for any graduate in Cambridge, but especially relevant given that the main teacher of 
Plato there during his education was Francis Cornford, an important Cambridge ritualist, 
and so should not be surprising that, given the failure of his anthropology teachers to 
offer helpful tools, Bateson reverted on the field, in Papua New Guinea, to three Plato-
inspired concepts: ethos, eidos, and schismogenesis. 
 
Plato, however, offered not only a philosophical anthropology, but also a cosmogony, 
and even a glimpse into the divine. The concern with ratio and with the divine are not in 
conflict, rather belong closely together, joined in a search for harmony which should not 
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be ‘constructed’ – this is again only Titanic hubris – rather recognised and then cared for. 
The real conflict is rather between technology, instrumental rationality and the 
underlying alchemic way of thinking, on one hand, and the singular beauty of this planet 
on the other, as it is; a beauty whose recognition, in the thinking of Plato (in the Timaeus), 
offers – together with eros, this crucial in-between or liminal force (in the Symposium) – 
the strength to convert to a life spent on preserving and promoting this beauty, thus a 
life not wasted without meaning. 
 
  
Notes 
 
i Interestingly, in Hungarian not only történelem ‘history’, tört ‘fraction’ and tör ‘break’ can 
be etymologically connected, but even töröl ‘wipe’, ‘cancel’ or ‘erase’ as well. 
ii For details, see Szakolczai (2013). 
iii See the 2009/1 issue of the journal, of which a book version is forthcoming; Horvath, 
Thomassen and Wydra (2014). 
iv See in particular the 2011 issue of the journal. 
v The term was introduced into the social sciences by Agnes Horvath (2000, 2008, 2010, 
2013a). 
vi About this, see Horvath (2013b), Horvath and Szakolczai (2013), and Szakolczai 
(2013b) for further details.  
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